The Impact of Corporate Governance on Capital Structure: The Empirical Study of the Agricultural Companies in the ASEAN Stock Exchange

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Abstract: The principal goal of companies is to maximize the wealth of shareholders, however, the authorized managers sometimes misuse their supremacy to enrich themselves and therefore they fail to comply with the interest of shareholders. Having seen this, good governance is necessary in order to minimalize the conflicts of interest. Corporate governance (CG) is believed that it can determine the selected funding structure and is reflected in the company's capital structure. The design of CG towards the capital structure links to the leverage which can be exercised as a bonding mechanism to control the directors to act based on the company's main goal. We investigate the effect of CG (audit committee size, board size, CEO tenure, director independence, profitability, size and growth) on the firm's capital structure (leverage). We use data on agricultural firms that are listed in the association of east Asian nation (ASEAN) stock exchange. Our findings demonstrate each country has different level of good governance. For Indonesia companies, we found that board size and tenure of CEO are the factors of good governance that have positive impact on capital structure. The factors that significantly affect good governance on capital structure in Thailand are audit committee and CEO tenure. For Singaporean companies, we discovered that CEO tenure is the only element that has positive impact on the capital structure. Companies in Malaysia documented few drivers of good governance such as audit committee, board size, CEO tenure and independent directors that have effect on capital structure.

1. INTRODUCTION

Capital structure has become one of the intriguing topics to studied. Modigliani and Miller (1958) remarked that capital structure did not affect the company's value assuming that the condition of capital market is perfect. In 1963, Modigliani and Miller revealed that debt can elevate the firm's value due to the benefit of tax saving. Based on the trade-off theory, a firm that has better capital structure and equity will be able to maximize the composition of its debts and the firm's value by means of gauging the benefits of tax saving and insolvent risk. Tarus and Ayabei (2016) regarded that the determinant factors in conjunction with capital structure were not certain, because the number of research findings have documented different results based on the categorical factors towards capital structure.

Corporate governance (CG) was believed to have an impact on the capital structure (Brander and Poitevin, 1992; Berger et al., 1995; Tarus and Ayabei, 2016). The logical reason behind their beliefs laid on the agency theory, which describes the existence of conflicts of interest among the agent and firm's owners. In the course of representing firm an agent can make a decision that satisfies his own interest. Mitigating the potential conflicts of interest, it is necessary to control the decisions made including capital structure particularly in the use of debts. Tarus and Ayabei (2016) viewed that fraud and outrage behavior have led the firms to formulate the rules and regulations to control how the commissioners supervise the organizational management. Maug (1997) in Tarus and Ayabei (2016) regarded that managers are assigned to conduct daily operations while commissioners are appointed to control and review the decisions by exercising their rights to influence the business decision making like determination of capital structure.

Our research is built on the similar independent variables from previous research conducted by Tarus Ayabi (2016), Dimitropoulus (2014) and Hussainey and Aljifri (2012). The interesting part of conducting this research is because the average debt-to-equity ratio in the agricultural industry has larger percentage among other industry in Indonesian stock exchange. Further, the study includes several stock exchanges in the south east Asian nations such as Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. The inclusion of those countries allows us to understand the role of agricultural companies and the implementation of ASEAN economic community treaty.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the concept of agency, Jensen and Meckling (1976) remarked that there is agency correlation between owners of companies and companies' management. This agency correlation is defined as a contract within an ownerships or more ownerships and an agent or more agents, that the agent has to run some services and exercise the given authorization to make decisions in the interest of owners. In case both parties wanted to maximize their owns interests then the conflicts of interest cannot be avoided and causing the agents will not always act for the sake of owners, but for their own interests. Hence, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) in Tarus and Ayabei (2016), Gottardo and Maria Moisello (2014) in Tarus and Ayabei (2016) reviewed that controlling the behavior of agents are necessary in order to reduce conflicts of interest that may happen.

Corporate governance is a system used to advocate and control the operations of companies. The organizational structure specifies the functions and rights based on the roles, such as boards, managers, shareholders, and commissioners. Also, it describes the procedures and regulations in corporate decision-making (OECD in Susilo and Simarmata, 2007:17). Velnampy and Niresh (2012) viewed that capital structure is a method used by companies to finance the business operations through long-term debts, equities and corporate bonds. The debt and equity are exercised to fund the business operations. Capital structure becomes very fundamental for every company as it correlates with the firm's ability to meet the interest of stakeholders. Board of directors are supposed to develop the capital structure that brings economic to the shareholders and stakeholders such as employees, clients, creditors and general public (Pandey, 2009 in Velnampy and Niresh, 2012).

Tarus and Ayabei (2016) cited the work of Razee et al (2003) in regard to the role of audit committee, that evaluates either financial control or business operations. It also provides advocacy, remunerations for the external auditors and report to the board of directors. Zhang et al (2007) revealed the negative correlation between audit committee and leverage. The reason that lies on this result is mainly shaped by the function of audit committee alone, that helps declining the leverage.

The Audit committee comprises people who are experienced in finance so that they can analyze whether or not the use of debt can reduce the leverage. Based on the financial analysis, the audit committee will suggest the board of directors to prioritize the interest of shareholders in the course of making decisions (Chan and Li, 2008 in Tarus and Ayabei, 2016). In addition, Chang et al (2009) as cited in Dimitropoulus (2014) journal reviewed that the more members of audit committee the better will be the financial report. This means that the function of debt as an instrument for the management control can be replaced by the members of audit committee in the company. Further, our hypothesis is built based on previous research findings.
H1. Audit committee size has negative correlation with leverage.

Board size is associated to number of board of directors in the company (Tarus and Ayabei, 2016). Former researchers such as Jensen (1986), Wen et al (1986), Anderson et al (2004) and Abor (2007) cited in Dimitropoulos's paper documented that the correlation between board size and use of leverage was significantly positive. This study employed the size of board of directors because the characteristic of agricultural industry in the Asean is attached to the so-called two-tier system, where the management role is undertaken by directors. Anderson et al (2004), Abor (2007) in Dimitropoulos (2014) remarked the larger size of board of directors will be more trusted and so will deescalate the cost of debt, leading to better use debt than equity. In conjunction with agency theory that shows that the larger size of board of directors the more will be the conflicts of interest among the management and owners of the

companies. Hence, it is necessary to use debt as controlling instrument to decrease the conflict itself.
H2. Board size is positively correlated with leverage

Chief executive officer (CEO) tenure means the average period of CEO in his/her assignments (Tarus and Ayabei, 2016). The influence of CEO tenure on leverage is based on the previous research, for example, Wen et al (2002), and Byrd et al. (2010) in Tarus and Ayabei (2016) have formulated CEO allegiance hypothesis that is associated to duration of CEO tenure in the companies. The longer tenure of CEO, the more possibilities of alignment with managers. As consequence, the decision of using debt to finance the operations will decline and so do the management control for executives.

In contrast, a research finding of Ahmad (2015) presented that CEO tenure has positive correlation with leverage. Further, CEO with longer tenure can influence the process of making strategic decision, because the CEO has better knowledge of financial and accounting. The better financial report presented by companies the easier will be for them to find external fund resources. Tarus and Ayabei (2016) are in line with Ahmed (2015) that the longer tenure of CEO the less criticism addressed to the management. Consequently, the debt as controlling instrument can be improved.
H3. CEO tenure is negatively correlated with leverage.

Independent director is defined as director that is indirectly appointed by companies and is not possessing psychological or economic dependence on the companies' management (Baysinger and Butler, 1985 in Tarus and Ayabei, 2016). Based on the agency theory, the impact of director independence on leverage is visible through looking at the number of independent director. The more independent director in board of director, the more rigid the supervision on managers and less conflict of interests within managers and companies' stakeholders. As a result, the level of using debt to finance the business operations will become lower (Wen et al, 2002 in Dimitropoulus, 2014). Jensen (1986) and Berger et al (1997) in Dimitropoulus (2014) opposed the previous findings that companies with more independent directors would prefer using debt to equity. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) in Dimitropoulus (2014) also viewed that the more independent directors will lead to lower yields of the bonds and improve the credit ratings in issuing new debt. Consequently, this will also lower the cost of debt and therefore issuing debt through using equity is no longer interesting for the companies.
H4. Independent director has negative correlation with leverage.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Design

This study is built on the basic research which means it develops research that has been done previously. Based on the objective, this research is clustered as causal research because it aims at analyzing the independent variables such as audit committee size, board size, CEO tenure, director independence, profitability, firm size and growth towards the dependent variable which is leverage for the agricultural firms that are listed in the ASEAN stock exchange for the period of 2012-2016. The sampling we use in this research is based on three criteria: (1) The firms are listed in the ASIAN stock exchange from 2012 to 2016. (2). Only in agricultural sector, and (3) the disclosure of audited financial reports from 2012 to 2016.

3.2. Variable and Definition of Operational Variable

3.2.1. Variable Dependent

Capital structure in this research is depicted in ratio of debt to total capital of a firm, that is listed in the ASEAN stock exchange for the period of 2012-2016. Leverage (LEVi,t) is Book value of long-term debt dividing with book value of long-term debt plus total equity based on market value.

3.2.2. Independent Variables

Audit Committee Size (AUDIT) is the number of audit committees that present in each company during the respective period. Board Size (BD_Size) is the number of board of directors in a certain firm. This can be verified in each firm that is registered in the ASEAN stock exchange respectively. Chief of Executive Officer tenure (C_TENURE) is the duration of CEO works in the company. Independent Director (DIR_IND) is associated with the amount of directors that conduct their tasks in the company independently.

3.2.3. Control Variables

Profitability accounts for the ability of company in obtaining profits. The profitability can be seen from return on asset (ROA) that manifests the effective management in exercising the total asset to generate bottom line. Firm Size describes the entire capitalization or number of resources owned by the firm. The size of company is also exposed by the total asset. Growth shows the augmentation of each company during the period of 2012-2016. This research is undertaken through exercising Turbin's Q to manifest the growth of company.

3.3. Hypothetical Test

Hypothesis test in this research uses multiple regression that can be depicted in the following formula.

$$Leverage_{it} = \propto + \beta_1.AUDIT_{1it} + \beta_2.BD_{SIZE\,2it} + \beta_3.C_{TENURE\,3it} + \beta_4.DIR_{IND\,4it} + \beta_5.ROA_{5it} + \beta_6.SIZE_{6it} + \beta_7.Tobin'sQ_{7it} + e \quad \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots (1)$$

Leverageit	= Ratio of debt in each company i and period t
AUDITit	= Total member of audit committees in each company i and period t
BD_SIZEit	= Number of board of directors in each company i and period t
C_TENUREit	= Number of years of CEO in each company i and period t
DIR_INDit	= Number of independent directors in each company i and period t
ROAit	= Comparison of net margin with total asset in each company i and period t
SIZEit	= The size of company in each company i and period t
Tobin's Qit	= The growth of opportunity for each company i and period t
	= Constant coefficient
β	= Coefficient regression
e	= Error

4. DISCUSSION

Total sampling used in this research is based on the aforementioned criteria in the course of period 2012-2016 and the detail is depicted in table 1.

Table 1. Research Sample

Criteria	ASEAN	Indonesia	Thailand	Singapura	Malaysia
Registered firms	2711	529	736	640	806
Registered agricultural firm in ASEAN stock exchange	78	21	11	6	40
Incomplete financial reports 2012-2016.	13	6	5	0	2
Eliminating the Outlier	5	1	0	0	4
Final Samples	60	14	6	6	34

(Source: Website of ASEAN stock exchange from 2012 to 2016, processed by authors)

Based on table 1, Malaysia has the first largest companies that are listed in the ASEAN stock exchange that is 40 companies. The second largest country is 21 companies respectively and then Thailand comes to the third largest country, that has 11 companies registered in the aforementioned stock exchange. Singapore comes to last country with 6 companies in the respective market. Nevertheless, after making some observation based on the characteristics and elimination of outliers, we have obtained total of 60 companies listed in the ASEAN stock exchange. In table 4 shows the descriptive analysis.

Table 2: Descriptive Analysis

	LEVERAGE	AUDIT	BD_SIZE	C_TENURE	DIR_IND	ROA	SIZE	TOBINS_Q
				ASEAN				
Mean	0.176302	3.196667	7.286667	12.66333	0.38157	0.039063	5.93038	1.215354
Max	0.908218	7	14	40	0.857143	0.288773	9.59333	7.170364
Min	0	0	2	0	0	-0.436311	2.419976	0.159834
Stdev	0.193876	0.564847	2.282218	8.861437	0.200412	0.064007	1.315184	0.772224
N	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300
				INDONESIA				
Mean	0.32226	2.957143	5.385714	10.45714	0.123129	0.022293	6.088912	1.477123
Max	0.908218	3	8	31	0.5	0.202923	7.918678	7.170364
Min	0	0	2	1	0	-0.436311	2.419976	0.576957
Stdev	0.279913	0.358569	1.354465	7.72852	0.143938	0.084196	1.298525	1.000308
N	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
				THAILAND				
Mean	0.099489	3.1	9.9	18.5	0.362908	0.068004	5.196816	1.259301
Max	0.386038	4	13	30	0.636364	0.288773	7.354139	3.300477
Min	0	3	8	5	0.25	-0.037274	3.642824	0.306832
Stdev	0.094853	0.305129	1.348051	7.257576	0.081482	0.086505	1.177902	0.731076
N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
				SINGAPORE				
Mean	0.140362	3.233333	6.433333	7.766667	0.548492	0.05661	6.566849	1.728334
Max	0.403156	5	9	20	0.857143	0.243869	9.59333	4.067081
Min	0	3	4	1	0.333333	-0.061166	4.036177	0.610144
Stdev	0.120082	0.504007	1.633345	5.399127	0.148073	0.061578	1.722163	0.794919
N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
				MALAYSIA				
Mean	0.136099	3.305882	7.758824	13.40588	0.461824	0.037765	5.882236	0.98681
Max	0.506572	7	14	40	0.8	0.279684	8.931449	2.771487
Min	0	3	4	0	0.25	-0.052093	3.523414	0.159834
Stdev	0.136993	0.644017	2.152626	9.360939	0.136193	0.045802	1.201927	0.517308
N	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170

(Source: Authors based on E-views 8.0)

Based on table 2, it shows the largest means of leverage is Indonesia with 32.226% and the lowest leverage is Thailand with 9.949%. Meanwhile for the audit committee, all the countries has nearly similar to each other, that is 3. The board of directors documents that Thailand has the highest score – 9.9 as compared to the other countries. Further, Indonesia has the least score that is 5.386. In term of length of CEO works in certain companies and in the country basis, CEOs in Malaysian companies have the average longest tenure that is 13.406 year of tenures. The CEOs that work for Singaporean agriculture companies has its average tenures 7.767 years. Although Singapore has the least average in term of CEO tenure, it has the highest average score – 54.849% and Indonesia has the lowest score that is 12.313%. The following table 3 will describe the result of regression analysis.

The hypothetical test in this research uses model fixed effect for companies in three different countries such as Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia while common effect is applied for the Thai companies in conjunction with the research's findings of Chow and Hausman. The analysis shows that the size of audit committee in Thailand and Malaysia has negative influence towards leverage. The reason for this is that the more member of audit committees the better will be the control and consequently it can reduce the agency cost. Better control means that the companies in both countries will benefit from reducing the over control when debt is used to finance the operations (Chang et al, 2009 cited in the journal of Dimitropoulos, 2014).

Table 3: Regression Analysis

Variable	ASEAN	Indonesia	Thailand	Singapura	Malaysia	Hypothesis
C	-0.0133	-0.5066	-0.0473	-0.3370	0.2752	
	(-0.5547)	(-3.2473)	(-0.5061)	(-0.7476)	(9.0040)	
AUDIT	-0.0266***	-0.0022	-0.0454*	-0.0247	-0.0370***	-
	(-4.9028)	(-0.2510)	(-1.9710)	(-0.3026)	(-4.8148)	
BD_SIZE	0.0052**	0.0189*	0.0036	0.0104	0.0046*	+
	(2.3416)	(1.8620)	(0.3097)	(0.1757)	(1.8295)	
C_TENURE	0.0011***	0.0125***	-0.0056**	0.0157***	-0.0003*	-
	(7.0741)	(3.4505)	(-2.7627)	(4.7176)	(-1.8612)	
DIR_IND	0.1401***	-0.0631	0.1793	0.4009	0.1112***	-
	(4.5889)	(-1.0758)	(0.4545)	(1.0753)	(4.9465)	
ROA	-0.3405***	-0.3907***	-0.3387***	-0.3011	-0.2667***	
	(-6.6998)	(-6.8891)	(-3.6714)	(-0.9590)	(-4.5135)	
SIZE	0.0341***	0.1051***	0.0361***	-0.0704**	-0.0083**	
	(12.6839)	(4.0059)	(5.2556)	(-2.1182)	(-2.0637)	
TOBINS_Q	-0.0166***	-0.0139***	0.0238*	-0.0265***	-0.0416***	
	(-3.2352)	(-3.3173)	(1.7339)	(-3.6631)	(-6.4933)	
R-*squared*	0.9889	0.9880	0.6993	0.8646	0.9687	
Adjusted R-*squared*	0.9858	0.9831	0.6037	0.7691	0.9589	
Probability (F-*Stat*)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	
Observations	300	70	30	30	170	

(Source: Authors based on the E-views 8) Notes: * : Significant 10%, ** : Significant 5%, *** : Significant 1%

Audit committee for Indonesia and Singapore is not significantly correlated with Leverage. This happens due to the fact that shareholders in both countries rather consider about the return factors or companies' performance than management control. This will cause shareholders not to pay more attention to control the management (Wulandari, 2006). Performance wise, Companies in Indonesia and Singapore has good performance referring to descriptive statistic, where the Tobin's Q average score 1.48 and 1.73 consecutively. What happens to this result is that audit committee in both countries is only used to meet the requirements that is stipulated in the regulation of financial service board no. 55/POJK.04/2015, which describes the formulation and guidelines for audit committee clause 4 and guidelines book for audit committee in Singapore section 1, the code guideline 12.1. It stated that companies are obliged to have at least three member of audit committees.

Board size has positive correlation with leverage at least it happens to Indonesian and Malaysian companies in the ASEAN stock exchange. It can be said that the number of board of directors at large level can escalate the credibility of companies and therefore it deescalates the cost of debt. This is in line with the result of Anderson et al, (2004) and Abor (2007) cited in Dimitropoulos, 2014, where companies can optimize use of debt as financial source to fund the operations as a result of low cost of debt. In addition, following the agency theory, a large size of board will probably provoke the conflicts of interest among the companies and their agents itself. This will lead to increase the debt as a mechanism to decrease the conflict of interest.

Insignificant correlation between the board size and leverage happened to companies in Thailand and Singapore. This happens because shareholders are believed to have been focused only on the companies' performance leading to less attentive to the management control. Furthermore, this result supports the finding of Wulandari (2006). However, following the result of descriptive statistic, the probability shows Thailand and Singapore have greater average score 0.068 and 0.057 as compared to other countries. This means that the board size triggers agency problem that is not taken care by shareholders. Therefore, it can be said that the use of debt as an instrument to control the management is not significant caused by the size of board.

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) tenure has positive correlation with leverage for Indonesia and Singapore. This evidence shows that the length of CEO tenure can lead them to master the finance and accounting and help making the financial report looks convincing. A better financial disclosure makes company to obtain external funds because creditors have no doubts in providing the companies with credit points. This result is in line with Ahmad (2015). Respectively, negative correlation happens to Thai and Malaysian companies. Our result is also in line with Wen et al., (2002) and Berger et al., (1995) as cited by Tarus dan Ayabei (2016), where the longer tenure of CEO leads to align with managers so that the decision of using debt can decrease the supervision.

Independent director and leverage is positively correlated, however, this is only occurring in Malaysian companies. This positive correlation is triggered by large number of independent directors in the companies. Consequently, the companies will be receiving high level of trust and leading them to higher credit ratings and eventually it will also be lowering the cost of debt. The lower cost of debt makes more interesting for the companies to use the debt to finance the operations than using equity. Our result supports the studies of Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) cited in the work of Dimitropoulos (2014), where the more independent director in companies can leverage the use of debt.

In contrast, Independent director and leverage is negatively correlation for companies in Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. The reason lies behind this result is described in the average result of Tobin's Q test and good performance in the companies, where the score shows 1.48 for Indonesia, 1.26 for Thailand and 1.73 for Singapore. Wulandari (2006) remarked that investors rather look at the factors that affect the performance of companies than the existence and role of independent directors. Further, the investors consider that companies' performance is more attractive to them regardless of how many independent directors available in the companies. Another reason is that, to a large degree, the independent directors were overdrawn to make decisions along with the executives. As a result, the borderline between management and independent directors broke (Robert et al., 2005 in Tarus and Ayabei, 2015). In some cases, independent directors might be dominated by the management so that they become rubberstamps and the role of independent directors for supervising the management are pointless (Hendry and Kiel, 2004 in Tarus and Ayabei, 2005).

Profitability for Indonesian and Thailand companies found to be uncorrelated with leverage. The result is supported by the pecking order theory, whereby the profits are held as priority source of fund to finance the companies followed by the debt and equity. Dimitoropoulos (2014) has cited Jiraporn et al, (2012) work that companies with high profitability prefer opt for holding the profits on to company account as funding sources to using debt and equity as funding sources.

Likewise, negative correlation found in the Singaporean companies. The reason for this is Singapore has the largest firm's size as compared to other countries for the same industry. Furthermore, bankruptcy is less likely to happen to the larger firm's size as compared to firm with smaller size. Larger firms can get access to different funding sources (Elsas dan Florysiak, 2008 dalam Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012). Therefore, companies at larger sizer take the benefits from gaining access to different type of financial sources to fund the operations. However, companies can disregard the use of profitability as leverage.

Size in the Indonesian, Thai and Singaporean companies has significant positive correlation with leverage. What lies behind this positive result is that bankruptcy can hardly happen to big size companies and the factor of economies of scale that makes big size companies remain stable. Hence, it gives the companies access to obtain external funds more easily and one of them is the use of debt (Elsas and Florysuak., 2008 in Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012).

The larger size of companies there will be more chances to develop the business because the companies can accumulate the internal funds to finance the potential growth. Although variable Size for Malaysian companies has negative correlation with leverage, the agriculture body can materialize its financial flexibility to deal with the uncertain condition in the industry – referring to average score of Tobin's Q that is the lowest 0.987 as compared to other three countries. Our finding supports the research finding of Byoun (2007) which remarks that the agriculture body in Malaysia prefer accumulating and using the internal funds for their capital structure to using external funds. This is believed that negative correlation was found in our hypothetical test, too.

Growth has negative correlation with leverage in Indonesian and Malaysian companies. The trigger is that companies with better growth will opt for using less debt to support the firms' policies that protect their shareholders. Further, companies are interested in avoiding the under investment that seems to be correlated problematic to using debt (Myers, 1997 in Padron et al., 2005). Meanwhile, the Growth in Thai and Singaporean companies turned to be significantly correlated to leverage. This positive correlation is literally driven by the high growth that is associated with the growth of its assets. Therefore, the capital structure is needed and this triggers the debt is to increase (Jannati, 2013 in Akhadiyah, 2015).

5. CONCLUSION

The implementation of corporate governance such as audit committee size, board size, CEO tenure, and independent director has significant correlation with capital structure for the companies that were listed in the ASEAN stock exchange. For Indonesian agricultural companies, the implementation of good governance that is significantly correlated with capital structure is board size and the tenure of CEO. The factors that significantly affect the performance of companies in Thailand are audit committee and CEO tenure. For Singaporean companies, CEO tenure is the only element that is significantly correlated with leverage. Unlike the aforementioned countries where companies are only correlated with one or two factors, companies in Malaysia documented few drivers that are correlated with leverage such as audit committee, board size, CEO tenure and independent directors. Overall, our research is in line with the agency theory that describes the function of supervision on the directors. As a result of less supervision of directors, the companies will increase their debt in order to increase the cost of controlling agent and conversely. We are aware of loophole in our research where; the amount of companies listed in the ASEAN stock exchange for each country are not equal, it tends to align with certain stock exchange, it has only four stock exchange in the ASEAN market and it focuses only on the agricultural industry. Therefore, this paper suggests that adding more observation to future research and more industries in the ASEAN stock exchange.

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Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Economics, Management, Accounting and Business, ICEMAB 2018, 8-9 October 2018, Medan, North Sumatra, Indonesia

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